COMPLETION OF CONTRACTS
TELEGRAPH.

BY MAIL OR

The determination of the time when and the place where
the factors which make up a contract merge in the contract
itself is important for manifold reasons. For instance, it determines the moment when neither party can retract without
the consent of the other, the moment when a chattel ceases
to be the property of one and becomes the property of another, and so free from the obligations of the one and. subject
to the obligations of the other,ino longer at the risk or charge
of the one but solely at that of the other.
The place where the contract is consummated determines
the rule (lex loci) which must often decide its interpretation
and its legality.
A contract, like a man, is generally a citizen of the country,
not in which it was begotten, but in which it was born.
The considerations above often determine the liability for
taxes or other liens and charges incident to the ownership of
property, the possession of an insurable interest and the right
to maintain an action with reference to the property in
question.
As a natural result the subject has been much mooted in the
courts, and yet some simple questions which, in the nature of
things, it would seem, must have frequently arisen for generations past were not settled until well on in the present century
and many are among the recent additions to the settled propositions of contract law among English-speaking men.
The rules which have seemed to crystallize out of the mists
and conflicts of the earlier discussions are, in the main, satisfactory and consistent. It is interesting in teaching "the law
of contracts," to see how well it seems to satisfy the sense of
justice of the abler and more earnest students. They often
try, I learn, on reading the statement of a case, to forecast the
decision, and find themselves seldom astray in this branch of
the law.
The process of the courts has been rather simple. A
contract is analyzed into an offer and an acceptance. The
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offer is no contract. It is only when an unqualified acceptance meets an offer still outstanding that a contract results,
but, oII such a meeting, the contract springs into existence, like
Minerva from the brow of Jove, full panoplied eo instante. At
that moment, in that place, the contract comes into being
and must operate and be judged accordingly. Applying these
rules it might seem easy to determine when and where a contract by correspondence is concluded, but the decision in
individual cases has been often difficult and by divided courts,
and the controversy over the question has been eager and
unyielding among text writers and reviewers.
In 18 18 the Court of King's Bench decided the much cited
case of Adams v. Lindsell, i Barn. & Alderson 681, passing
upon a claim for the non-delivery of wool, where defendants
had sent by post to plaintiffs, in a neighboring county, offering
8oo tods of fleeces of a certain quality at a named price, "receiving your answer in course of post." The offer was delayed by
a misdirection. An answer accepting was sent by post the same
evening the offer arrived. This answer, it was held, closed the
contract the moment it was posted, and as the delay in replying was due to the defendant's negligence in a misdirection, it
was held it could not prejudice plaintiff's rights. That a sale
to others, on not getting the expected reply, would not relieve
the defendant. The court said: " For if the defendants
were not bound by their offer when accepted by the plaintiff
till the answer was received, then the plaintiff ought not to be
bound till after they had received the notification that the
defendants had received their answer and assented to it. And
so it might go on ad iftfnitum."
This doctrine received no material addition in England
until the House of Lords decided, in 1848, Dunlop v. Higgins, i H. of Lds. Cases 381. The facts there passed on were
that after some correspondence which had resulted in an offer
of iron on certain terms from Dunlop, Messrs. Higgins immediately mailed a reply, "We will take the 2,000 tons you offer
us." By mistake this reply was dated a day later than its
true date, but the postmark showed it was mailed in due season. It was held to be an-unconditional acceptance put in the
post office in due time and that the contract was consummated
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the instant it was posted, and the one mailing was in no way
responsible for any casualties in the post-office establishment
as for a delay in its delivery.
In this case the Lord Chancellor, in his opinion, quoted
very freely from the preceding case and logically applied its
doctrine.
In 1872 there was decided fn Re Imper. Land Co. of Marseilles, Harris Case, Law Reports 7 Chan. Ap. 587, where Mr.
Harris, of Dublin, had sent to the directors of the above company at London a letter asking for 200 shares, or any smaller
amount, in the above company. One hundred shares were allotted him and a notification mailed to him on the fifteenth or on the
sixteenth of March, very early in the morning. A letter was
sent by him to the company, mailed on March 16, saying that
he withdrew his offer to subscribe. The contract was held to
have been completed the moment the company's secretary
mailed to him the notification of the allotment made him, and
his withdrawal of his offer was held ineffectual. The court
reviews the case of B. & A. Teleg. Co. v. Colson, Law Reports,
6 Exch. io8, and while evidently "disapproving that doctrine,
yet holds that it decided that the posting of a letter of acceptance, if it arrives, is a complete contract, yet if from any
cause, such as a failure of duty by the post office, the letter
never arrives at all, then there is a difference.
In 1879 the Court of Appeal decided, Household F. & C.
Accident Ins. Co. (Limited) v. Grant, Law Reports, 4 Excq.
Div. 219. In that case Baggallay, L. J., speaking for the
majority of the court, came to the conclusion that the House
of Lords in Dunlop v. Higgins, supra,announced a rule inconsistent with the rule of Colson's case, and that a letter of
acceptance duly posted, but never received, completed the
contract and bound the parties from the moment of posting
exactly as if received at that moment.
In Byrne & Co. v. Van Tienhoven, Law Reports, 5 Com.
Pleas Div. 344, the High -Court of Justice in 188o decided
an action for damages on this state of facts. The defendant
at Cardiff, Wales, wrote to the plaintiff at New York, October
I, 1879, offering, i,ooo boxes of tin plates of a named brand,
at a certain price, calling for a reply by cable on or before the
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fifteenth here. The acceptance was cabled back October I ,
and a letter of further acceptance posted October 15. October 8 defendant sent by post to the plaintiffs a withdrawal of
the offer of October I. This revocation reached the plaintiffs
October 2o and so some days after the sending of the telegram
and the letter of acceptance. It was claimed that this
amounted to a withdrawal of the offer before its acceptance,
but the New York house had already resold the tin and
insisted upon the performance of the contract. The court
declined to follow Pothier and other civilians of celebrity who
are of opinion that there can be no contract if an offer is
withdrawn before it is accepted, although the withdrawal is not
communicated to the person to whom the offer has been
made.
It set against that view the opinion expressed by our own
Federal Supreme Court in Tayloe ,v. M. F. Ins. Co., 'ited
below, that a state of the mind cannot be regarded in dealings
between man and man, and that an uncommunicated revocation is, for all practical purposes and in point of law, no revocation at all.
It holds " It may be taken as now settled that where an
offer is made and accepted by letters sent through the post,
the contract is completed the moment the letter accepting the
offer is posted, even though it never reaches its destination."
But it holds this rests on the principle that the offerer has
expressly or impliedly made the post office his agent to receive the acceptance. That this principle is inapplicable to
the withdrawal of an offer because there is no such assent by
the other party that the post office should be his agent to
receive such withdrawal. That any other rule would leave
one who received an offer by post in uiter uncertainty whether
the contract was closed or not until such time had elapsed as to
assure him no letter revoking the offer had been posted prior
to his posting his acceptance. The eminent judge (Lindley,
now Lord Lindley and Master of the Rolls) concludes that
legal principle and practical convenience concur in supporting
these views.
The case of Henthorn v. Fraser,Law Reports 2 Ch. (1892)
27, decided in the Court of Appeal in 1892, dealt with a case
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where an offer was not sent by post, but the secretary of a
building society handed to the plaintiff, on July I, at Liverpool, a written refusal "of the Flamank street property at 750
pounds for fourteen days." July 8 the Land Company got
an offer of 760 pounds for this property, and the secretary,
between 12 and I o'clock on that day, posted a letter addressed
to the plaintiff at Birkenhead withdrawing the previous option.
This was delivered to the plaintiff's address between 5 and 6
o'clock that evening, but he was out, and it first reached his
hands about 8 o'clock. In the meantime, at 3.5o p. m. the
same day, the plaintiff by his solicitor at Birnkenhead, had
posted an unconditional acceptance of the offer, addressed to
the secretary, which acceptance was received the next morning. An action for specific performance of the contract was
brought, and the principal opinion by thn late gifted Lord
Herschell, whose sudden and lamented death in this country
is so recent, is a model of lucid reasoning and a complete
review of the English authorities to its date. The conclusiod
is reached that an offer need not be made by post in order to
constitute the post office the agent of the offerer to receive
the reply. Lord Herschell states the rule thus: " Where the
circumstances are such that it must have been within the contemplation of the parties that, according to the ordinary usages
of mankind, the post might be used as a means of communicating the acceptance of an offer, the acceptance is complete
as soon as it is posted."
Professor E. T. Holland, in his " Elements of Jurisprudence" (8th ed., p. 237-39), compares the doctrine of various
European codes and nations on the subject, exhibits the
English rule as above indicated, and shows that upon the Continent views are by no means unanimous.
To turn to the American decisionsIn 1822 the Supreme Court of Massachusetts, in McCulloch
v. The Eagle Ins. Co., I Pick. 278, decided that where an offer
to insure property was posted January I, and followed by a
letter retracting the offer on the second, although the reply
accepting the offer of January I was posted before the retraction was received, there was no contract. Chief Justice Parker
holds the "treaty open" until the accepting letter was received
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by the company, and prior to that the company withdrew its
offer.
So that Ithus early the Massachusetts court, under the
lead of its great chief justice, put itself in conflict with the
doctrine of the English court.
In 1830 the Court of Errors of New York decided the case
of Mactier's Admr. v. Fith, 6 Wend. 103, holding that an
offer to sell a cargo of brandy having been sent from Santo
Domingo to New York and having been accepted by a letter
posted at New York on a certain day, the posting of the letter
of acceptance closed the contract, and the death of the acceptor, before his letter reached its -destination, did not alter its
effect. The opinions rest expressly on Adams v. Lindse,
supra, and Mr. Justice Marcy reviews and contrasts that decision with the conclusion of the Massachusetts court, and
testing them by "reason and the practical results that are
likely to flow from them," strongly adheres to the English
authority.
In 1849 the Supreme Court of the United States (Tayloe v.
Merchants' F. Ins. Co., 9 How. 390) passed upon the case of a
gentleman named Tayloe, who had obtained a proposition by
post, from an insurance company, to insure his dwelling on
certain terms. The letter reached Mr. Tayloe December 20,
and on the next day he accepted by posting a letter to that
effect and enclosing his check for the premium, as agreed. A
day later, and before his letter had reached its address, a great
part of the dwelling was consumed by fire, and the company
later refused, on receipt of his letter, to accept the premium or
issue the policy. It was held that the contract was complete
the moment Mr. Tayloe mailed his letter of acceptance, and
the cases of Adams v. Lindsell, I B. & A. 681, and Mfactier v.
Frith, 6 Wend. 103, are quoted and adopted in Mr. Justice
Nelson's extended and valuable opinion.
In 1893 the Supreme Court of the United States, in Patrick
v. Brennan, 13 S. C. R. 811, quoted at length from Tayloe v.
Ins. Co., supra, and fully approved its doctrine on the above
subject, finding authorities abundant to support it and citing
with like approval the kindred English and American cases.
The Court of Appeals of New York, in 1867, in Trevor v.
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Wood, 36 N. Y. 307, held, " Where the offer is by letter or by
telegram, the acceptance signified in the same manner is sufficient, irrespective of the time when it comes to the knowledge
of the proposing party." The court cites no case dealing
with acceptance by telegram but relies on the principles applied to letters by post as entirely analagous.
Attention is there called to the fact that in Mactierv. Frith,
6 Wend. 103, the letter of acceptance was not sent by public
post, as "it was to go from New York to Jacmel, in the island
of Santo Domingo, between which places .no communication
was had at that time by mail."
Many other cases are collected and the whole subject admirably reviewed under the title " Letters" and sub title
"Contract," 13 Am. & Eng. Enc. of Law, pp. 233 to 236.
Professor Harriman, in his thoughtful and thorough little
hand-book on " Contracts," after calling attention to the
English doctrine on this subject, on page 94 says: "The
"same rule prevails throughout the United States with the ex"ception of Massachusetts, where an early case laid down the
"doctrine that an actual communication of an acceptance is
"necessary to complete the contract. There has been much
"artificial reasoning on this point caused by a desire on the part
"of judges and text writers to make every case harmonize
"with the subjective, consensual theory of contract, that there
"must be a meeting of minds to constitute a contract. It
"would seem as if the simple and straightforward reasoning of
"Lord Herschell in Henthorn v. Fraser,the latest English case
"on this point, ought to sweep away the fog which has so
"long obscured this simple though important question."
He points out that in Alabama the doctrine prevails that
when an offer and due acceptance are both sent by mail the
contract becomes binding as of the date of the offer, but he
deems this a mere judicial vagary. Mr. Harriman had the
sagacity and felicity to point out in 1896 that there seemed
little doubt that the peculiar doctrine of Massachusetts would
be overruled in that State (Harriman on Contracts, p. 94,
note), resting his prediction upon Bishop v. Eaton, 161 Mass.
496, which, though inconsistent with the earlier cases, did not
review them and discussed the subject rather slightly. His
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prediction seems fulfilled in Brauerv. Shaw, 168 Mass. 198,
decided March 29, 1897. The facts in that case were as follows: Defendants telegraphed at I1.3o a. m. to plaintiff with
regard to shipment of cattle by ocean steamer, "subject
prompt reply will let you May space fifty-two six." This was
received in New York at 12.16, and at 12.28 a reply was sent
accepting the offer. For some reason this was not received
by defendant until 1.2o. At one o'clock, the defendants telegraphed, revoking their offer and this message was received
at 1.43. The court seems to hold the contract completed the
moment the acceptance was delivered to the telegraph company and that the message withdrawing the offer was ineffective until it reached the other party and was therefore too late.
Judge Holmes, for the court, declines to follow the contrary
suggestion in McCulloch v. Eagle Ins. Co., I Pick. 278, and
prefers the rule stated in the above English cases and by the
Supreme Court of the United States.
Harriman says : " Where the parties have agreed to transact
business by telegraph, the contract is completed as soon as
the offer is delivered to the telegraph company." Again Professor Harriman (Harriman on Cont., p. 95) observes, "Since
the contract is complete when the letter of acceptance is
posted, the subsequent fate of the letter is of no consequence."
Sir F. Pollock thinks that Lord Cottenham, in Dunlop v.
Higgins, I H. L. Cases 381, "seems to have thought the con"tract was absolutely concluded by the posting of the accep"tance (within the prescribed or a reasonable time) and that it
"mattered not what became of the letter afterwards. It appears
"to have been so understood in Duncan v. Topham, 8 C. B.
"225, where, however, discussion was on other grounds."
(Pollock on Cont., p. 641.)
Professor Langdell thinks the communication of the acceptance to the offerer is necessary, and until this occurs no
contract is made. He says, Langdell Sum. Law Contracts,
Section 14, in case of contracts inter prasentes the words
or signs must be both heard or seen, in contracts inter
absentes the letter must be received and read. His principal and almost only authority for this view is a case decided
in 1813 by the Court of Cassation in France, namely, S. v. F.
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D. and others (reported in Merlin deJurisprudence,Tit. Vente, I,
Art. III,No. XI, bis.), which may be more conveniently found
in Langdell's Cases on Contracts, 156-6o, and is reprinted by
Professor Langdell's permission in I Keener's Cases on Cont.,
I49, where the able and ingenious but almost fanciful argument of Merlin covers six pages, the decree in his favor three
lines and a half. Merlin quotes extensively from the pundits
of the civil law to support the proposition that a letter of
acceptance may be revoked at any time before it comes to the
knowledge of the offerer, and he says, "Now it is an elemen"tary maxim that I can recall my agent so long as he has not
"executed his mandate." " I can therefore recall the letter
"which I have addressed to you so long as it has not reached
"you, so long as it has not brought to you the words which
"I had given it in charge for you."
He puts the case of a deaf person who offers you goods at
a fixed price. You reply that you will take them. He answers that he cannot hear and prays that you will write your
answer. You write to him, " I said I would, but on further
reflection your proposition is not satisfactory." Merlin urges
no one could pretend that you were bound by your spoken
acceptance so unheard by the offerer. He also puts the case of
one with an acoustic vault with speaking tubes which delay
a message spoken in them five minutes. An offer is made by
the owner, and the reply accepting is spoken into his speaking
tube, but, before the five minutes pass requisite for it to reach
his ear, the acceptor countermands it by running to him and
speaking directly to him, and he urges that it could not be
claimed that the first acceptance in such case bound.
It is submitted that though this reasoning is most ingenious
and the situation described perhaps somewhat puzzling, yet, in
the matter of treating a letter of acceptance duly mailed,
according to the terms of the offer or custom of business in
contemplation of the parties, as an agent who has not executed the mandate of his principal he somewhat evades the
question.
The courts of England and America have so far taken a
different view and, treating the post as the agent of the offerer
duly authorized to receive the reply, treat the reply as in the
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offerer's hands as soon as it is in the hands of his agent and
that its subsequent loss, delay or miscarriage can have no
effect upon the contract, which was consummated at that
moment, any more than any other act or omission on the part
of one party to a contract, or his agent, except as the other
party assents thereto or avails himself thereof. If the suggestion of Professor Langdell that the letter of acceptance
must be received and read to complete the contract be
adopted, a most inconvenient element of uncertainty would
be introduced and an acceptance by writing would always be
ineffectual until the acceptor's voluntary act, namely, his reading it, operated in turn as an acceptance of the acceptance. If
this is requisite then it must be pleaded and proved in all
cases involving such a transaction unless it may be presumed
from the proper mailing, even then it may be denied and put in
issue and the receipt of the letter by the offerer is of no avail
until he sees fit to read the acceptance. The acceptor has
no means of knowing this, and cannot, during a length of
time, treat the contract as complete. It is submitted, with
deference, that the practice of business men is quite the reverse
and the rule holding a sale complete on delivery of goods
to a common carrier, addressed to the buyer and in accord
with his order, strongly supports the view that the acceptance,
being posted, closes the contract. If such goods are thereafter destroyed, the loss falls on the consignee, not the consignor. Lord Cottenham, in Dunlop v. Higgins, i H. L. C.
381, compared the letter of acceptance to one containing
notice of dishonor of a bill of exchange. "Whether that
"letter be delivered or not is a matter quite immaterial, because
"for accidents happening at the post office he is not respon" sible." This with the accompanying discussion has often
been considered as a mere dictum, but in Household Ins. Co.
v. Grant, L. R. 4 Exch. D. 216, the Court of Appeal speaking
through Thesiger, L. J., held that this doctrine was a ratio
decidendi in the above decision and so binding upon the
English courts, and the majority of the court there hold that
an acceptance duly posted binds the offerer whether or not it
ever comes to his hand.
Bramwell filed a very vigorous dissent and Sir F. Pollock
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most eminent of English legal scholars, regrets that this dissenting opinion did not prevail, although he holds that the
result must be taken as final. (Pollock on Contracts, p. 36.)
A like conclusion had been long before reached by the
Court of Appeals of New York in Vassar v. Camp, I I N. Y.
441, decided in 1854, where it was held that merchants at
Sackett's Harbor, having forwarded by post to a brewer at
Poughkeepsie a proposed contract signed by the former in
duplicate, for purchase and sale of barley, and the brewer
having promptly signed the contract and deposited one of the
duplicates so signed in the post office at Poughkeepsie, properly directed to the merchant, that consummated the contract
and it was obligatory on the merchants whether they received
it or not.
The Supreme Court of Wisconsin, in Washburn v. Fletcher,
42 Wis. 152, in 1877 fully adopted the doctrines of the above
New York case and held the law well settled in England and
this country as there announced.
If the person making the offer fears he may suffer any hardship under this rule, he can adequately- protect himself by
providing that unless the acceptance reaches his personal
knowledge within a fixed time, the same shall have no effect.
If the rule contended for by
(Pollock on Cont., *36.)
Merlin and Professor Langdell were sustained there would be
no equally simple and convenient way for the acceptor to pro-.
tect himself.
In a rule of this sort, so largely affecting commercial transactions, perhaps clearness, certainty and uniformity are more
to be desired than perfect accord with the theory of the meeting of the minds in contracts and perhaps, if either should
yield, it is rather this theory than the convenience of commerce.
In the judgment of the majority of the able judges who
have considered the rule it is not in conflict with the elementary requirement as to contracts. (See opinion Thesiger, L. J.,
in Household F. & C. Ins. Co. v. Grant,L. R., 4 Exch. _216.)
He fully admits the hardship of the rule in some cases, but
points out the far more mischievous consequences of the
opposite rule.
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The acceptance, of course, will not be consummated by
mailing an unstamped letter: Blake v. Hainburg-BremenF. .
Co., 35 Albany L. J. 82 ; Britton v. Phzilips, 24 How. Pr. III.
And the question of what is such a mailing as will close the
contract was quite fully.examined by Mr. Justice CozzensHardy in November last in the Court of Appeals, Chancery
Division. See London & N. Bank, In Re, Jones* exparte, 69
L. J. Ch. 24; 8 1 L. T. 512. In that case a letter of allotment
of shares was proved to have been delivered at the general
post office at 7.3o a. m., by handing the same to a postman
met at the entrance of the post office, with a small fee, on his
offer to take the same. This letter, however, bore a post mark
showing its posting at 11.3o a. m. At 8.3o a.m. a letter withdrawing the offer to subscribe for shares was delivered at the
company's office and opened by its secretary at 9.30. It was
shown by the postal regulations the postman was prohibited
from taking charge of letters. It was decided that, although
it is the settled law that an offer is to be deemed accepted
when the letter containing the acceptance is posted, and no
delay on the part of the post office in delivering the letter will
be material, yet, a town postman is not an agent of the post
office to receive letters and consequently the delivery to him
of a letter of acceptance of an application for allotment of
shares will not, for the purpose of fixing the time of the acceptance, be regarded by the court as a posting of the letter.
I add one comparatively late case showing the effect, in construing a contract, produced by the above-rule that a contract
is made, not by the offer but by the acceptance, and so at
the place the acceptance is mailed. In 1898 in Zeltner v.
Irwin, 49 N. Y. Sup. 337, it was held that the advertising circulars of a stock broker, setting out the advantages of certain
methods of dealing and the facilities of the broker, was no such
offer as to make the mailing of a letter to him with funds for
investment an acceptance. That this letter itself was an offer
to contract and if the broker mailed back his acceptance from
Pittsburg, Pa., it was this second letter which consummated
the contract. Therefore the place of the mailing of this last
letter determined the place where the contract was made, and
so the law which governed it. That therefore the contract
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above must be governed by the laws of Pennsylvania. It was
admitted such a contract was void by New York statutes, but
urged that there was no proof that it contravened the Pennsylvania law. The court held that, in the absence of proof, the
Pennsylvania law would be presumed to be the common law,
which did not invalidate a wagering contract and that this contract, being a Pennsylvania contract, therefore was good where
it was made and so binding everywhere.
See this doctrine upheld: 7 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law (2d ed.),
p. 136, citing Cowan v. O'Connor, 20 Q. B. Div. 640, the full
syllabus of which is as follows: An order to make certain
bets having been telegraphed by postal telegraph from the
plaintiff, without the city of London, to the defendant within
it, he telegraphed from the city that the order had been
obeyed. Held, that the contract of agency was made in the
city and that an action for the breach of such contract was
within the jurisdiction of the Lord Mayor's Court.
Among the many interesting discussions of this subject two
of especial interest are'found in 7 Am. Law Review, 433 ; 8
Am. Law Review, 182.
If the doctrine is taken as settled, as it seems to be in
both England and America, that one who makes an offer
under such conditions that an answer by post or telegraph is
to be contemplated, is bound by the acceptance the moment
it is delivered to the postal or telegraph authorities, whatever
the later fate of the message, then everyone making such an
unqualified offer, in effect, offers to be bound by such acceptance so delivered, and where parties voluntarily submit
themselves to a liability they can not complain of any hardship.
The controversy as to the logic of the English and American rule is perhaps further promoted by the postal regulations
of this country, which permit the sender of a letter in many
cases, on proper proceedings, to recall his letter after mailing
at any time before delivery. However, if the moment of posting consummates the contract, then the subsequent act of one
party, it is submitted, can not dissolve it. The acceptor has
done that which, the terms of the offer or the customs of business which a court reads into the offer, have indicated would
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be sufficient to fix Ithe liability as by an acceptance directly
communicated. The offerer in effect says: " Hand your acceptance to the postal authorities, they are my agents to receive
it." That being so, on such delivery the offerer is bound.
He has received the acceptance. Facit per alium facit per se.
Charles Noble Gregory.
College of Law,
University of Wisconsin.

